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UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTSA Report to the Secretary of State from the Panel of ConsultantsOn DisarmamentPART ONE - IS DISARMAMENT RELEVANT?Section I. Reasons for Questioning
The Relevance of Arms Limitation.

In recent years, at least among sophisticated students of the problem, a first and most important question to be asked about the subject of the control and limitation of armaments is "Does it have any meaning"? The history of the years before World War II provides a striking illustration of the fact that a naive faith in the efficiency of the idea of disarmament as a preventive of war is not only unjustified but dangerous. In this period there were two great efforts at disarmament, the naval treaties and the unsuccessful effort at general agreements conducted in Geneva. The naval treaties turned out to be of no lasting value, and indeed, by their apparent success, they may have contributed to the policy of withdrawal which allowed Japanese expansion to proceed to the point where war in the Pacific became inevitable. As for the enormous effort to achieve a general limitation of arms through the League of Nations, futility is the kindest word that the historian can use.

The most modest conclusion that can be drawn on these episodes is that efforts to achieve any limitation of

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Armaments can do no good unless they are closely integrated with the real political problems of international affairs. That meaning there was in the Naval Treaties of Washington and London was a meaning directly related to a political status quo in which the peace of the Western Pacific was confided to the care of the Japanese Empire. So long as this trust was not abused, there was no harm and much good in the Naval Treaties. When this part of the arrangement broke down, under the pressure of Japanese expansion, the whole settlement became worthless. In Europe, the same point was demonstrated in a different way: the fact that the negotiations on disarmament never escaped from the futility of constantly expanding paper plans was a direct result of the fact that they were never effectively integrated with the realities of European politics. The result was that history went down one path while the disarmament negotiations went down another, until at last when the disarmament conference was ready to have its first full-fledged meeting, in 1933, Adolph Hitler was already in power, and it had become urgent for men of good will to turn their thoughts from the control of armaments to the control of aggression by armed strength.

Some observers take a still more critical view of the possibilities of the control of arms, arguing that this

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problem is not even an important part of political issues in international affairs. On this reckoning, an arms race is not the sole cause of international tension, as the idealists of the 1920's often thought; it is not even a contributing factor, as more moderate critics suggest; it is nothing more than a thermometer which registers the heat generated in other ways. If this heat increases to the point of explosion, there will be a war; if, on the other hand, the international temperatures should go down, the thermometer of armaments will follow suit. The important thing, therefore, is to turn the efforts of statesmen and nations toward the settlement of those issues which are most likely to produce international heat. If, and only if, such settlements can be achieved, will there be any limitation in the arms race.

Whether or not this more extreme view is accurate, this much at least seems clear--that no good can come of efforts to consider the problem of limitation of armaments in a vacuum. For the student of contemporary policy, this means simply that it becomes essential to consider the question of arms limitation in the light of the great two-power struggle between the United States and the USSR. This is the struggle which has given rise to the contemporary arms race, and any genuine limitation of armaments must somehow be connected with such a change in the character of this struggle that the limitation

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has a chance of survival. It is therefore most unfortunate that the honest student of the contest between these two great powers must recognise their differences to be singularly deep-seated, so that it seems exceedingly unlikely that any genuine and large-scale political settlement will be possible within the present generation. The gulf which separates the Soviet world from the world of the United States and her allies is wider and deeper than those which diplomats normally expect to find between great powers or groups of powers. The inner necessities of the two kinds of societies appear to require that they should be in contact one with another; the better we come to understand the Soviet Union, the more we are driven to accept the inevitability of Soviet hostility; the more we are true to our own concepts of the good society, the less we can accept the notion that we can in any way underwrite the present power of the rulers of the Soviet Union. Nor is it possible for us to suppose that the two great groups of powers can live apart from each other; all around the world their borders touch each other, and their interests conflict. If we have learned anything since 1945, it is that the world in which we live is one in which there also exists a great and hostile power system. It is for this world that we must design our policies, and policies that cannot survive in such a world must be discarded. →

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These conclusions already seem to set sharp limits to the meaning of efforts to achieve an international control of disarmament, but there is worse to come.

Not only is there hostility between the United States and the USSR, and not only is this hostility unusually deep and wide; it is also evident that unless there is constantly maintained a sufficient level of armed strength in the non-Soviet world, there will be imminent danger of acts of aggression by the USSR which might precipitate a third ^{their} World War. In order simply to hold its own, the western nations have been forced into a great new effort at rearmament, and while there may be argument as to the proper limit of this effort, there can be no disagreement among serious students as to its necessity. It is urgently necessary for the West to increase its strength. Until such strength has been achieved, in appropriate quantity, and in the right places, the free world will be in constant danger of additional acts of expansionism on the part of the Soviet Union. So in addition to the fundamental facts of Soviet-hostility deep-seated hostility between the two systems of nations, the student who is concerned with the place of the limitation of armaments must observe that now and for some years to come the West will be deeply and necessarily committed to a program of rearmament.

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It is in this context that it becomes useful to ask whether all discussion of the control of armament is not now irrelevant.

It appears to be the general view of most qualified American students of these matters that the considerations we have been discussing do in fact make the subject of arms control relatively unimportant, at least for the present. There is widespread acceptance of the position urged by Secretary Johnson, that effective negotiation with the USSR must await the development of situations of strength. This does not mean that the limitation of arms is unimportant, or that work on plans for arms control should be abandoned. It means rather, in the view of the Department of State, that such work be essentially preparatory in nature. And while the government maintains its firm attachment to the principle of the limitation of armaments, while indeed it has energetically reasserted its basic interest in this aspect of the effort to establish a workable system of international security, its larger efforts have been devoted to the development of those situations of strength which are so generally agreed to be necessary.

And although it is entirely plain that the government's announcement of its disarmament plan proceeds out of a deep and genuine concern for the eventual achievement of effective limitation of arms throughout the world, it is a painful fact that current American efforts toward disarmament are of such

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character as to lend support to the contention that a position of the limitation of armaments is not at present relevant to international reality. The proposals which the United States has made in the United Nations, and the discussions to which it has been a party, pertain to the establishment of conditions of arms control which could only exist in a world almost entirely different from that in which we find ourselves.

The very safeguards which are intended to make these plans acceptable to the American people are stages and safeguards which cannot but be resisted by the rulers of the Soviet Union so long as those rulers have the characteristics which make the international situation as dangerous as it is. The more elaborate the proposals which are advanced in the United Nations, the less they seem to have any present reality. And since these proposals are made in the name of disarmament, it is not unnatural that students who recognize their unreality should suppose that the whole topic of the limitation of armaments is irrelevant.

Taken together the propositions which we have been considering make a formidable case for the notion that the limitation of armaments is not a significant part of the current pattern of American policy, except insofar as it may be desirable to appear to the world as a nation which believes in this notion as a part of some hypothetical future. No

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agreement on the limitation of armaments can have value--
 cont as a larger settlement; such as the pattern of hostility
 in the United States and the USSR that such larger settlements
 are hardly possible now, and may not be possible at any time;
 plans for the limitation and control of armaments in a world
 very different from this one are plainly not relevant to
 present problems; does it not follow that those who are
 responsible for framing policy should give their attention
 to other matters than the limitation of arms?

Certainly this question would be answered in the
 affirmative by a very large number of students. Unfortunately
 the problem is complicated by the fact that the current arms
 race is of a quite unprecedented character. Three properties
 set the current contest off from any which has preceded it.
 First the two great power blocs are rapidly acquiring the capa-
 city to achieve the total destruction of each other. Second,
 the development of this capacity is accompanied, at least in
 the United States, by an increasingly rigid commitment to the
 doctrine of the unlimited offensive or counter-offensive.
 Third, there is an unprecedented disparity between the degree
 to which the United States and the USSR are connected in economics
 and politics, and the degree to which they are able to reach
 each other in a military way; a world which remains relatively

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large in the economic, political, and social sense is becoming extremely small in the military sense. Each of these three propositions seriously affects the notion that the limitation of arms is not important, and taken together they force the conclusion that however unreal it may seem, of thought which dismisses the problem of arms control as irrelevant is itself dangerously incomplete. But to make this assertion persuasive, in the face of the considerations we have been discussing, it is necessary to describe in some detail the meanings of each of these three propositions.

Section II. The Character of the Atomic Arms Race.

Although it is no secret that both the United States and the USSR are engaged in the production of atomic bombs, and although it is impossible for any serious student to be ignorant of the fact that atomic bombs are instruments of a wholly new order of destructive power, the special character of the race in atomic weapons is not, perhaps, as widely understood as it might be. In the very sense that this weapon is something new and terrible, combined with an awareness of the degree to which national safety may be involved in maintaining a proper discretion, have combined to reduce the quantity and quality of responsible discussion to a surprisingly low level, and this has been true almost as much within the government as outside it, since responsible officials are

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among the first to avoid any hint of trespassing upon grounds so sensitive as the field of atomic energy has generally been held to be. Yet without an appreciation of the special and extraordinary characteristics of the contest ~~relevant~~ⁱⁿ to atomic weapons, it is impossible to reach any conclusions as to the importance of the problem of the limitation of armaments. It therefore seems a necessary part of this report that there should be included here a sober statement of the basic realities of the contest over the atomic bomb, atomic arms race.

It is now just a little over seven years since the first atomic explosion occurred, in July, 1945. In that first year only a handful of bombs was/available, and in the first few years thereafter, the United States made no great effort to increase its production of fissionable material; important efforts to expand our production began only in 1949, after the first explosion in the Soviet Union. Yet the amount of fissionable material on hand has increased at a constantly accelerating rate, until now, we have enough material for atomic bombs having an average power much greater than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Since 1945 four successive programs of expansion have been launched; production will continue to increase rapidly through the next decades.

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For the years from 1945 to 1960, the pattern of this increase is that the stockpile tends to double every second year. Thus the atomic bomb is not only the most powerful weapon in history; it has the characteristic that once you know how to make it, the amount of power you have on hand multiplies at a quite extraordinary rate of speed.

For is this pattern of regularly multiplied stockpiles peculiar to the United States; there is no reason why it should not be expected to do ear also in the case of the Soviet Union, since its principal causes are inherent in the nature of atomic technology. Classifiable material does not wear out, and the process of producing it almost inevitably leads to technical improvements which increase production. There is no permanently important shortage of raw materials for any great power. Compared to other military items, moreover, atomic bombs are cheap. The Soviet Union started later than the United States, and her effort is probably smaller in scale, so that she may never have as many bombs as the United States at any given time, but she can easily have as many at any time as the United States had a few years previously. This means that the time when the Russians will have material to make 1000 atomic bombs may well be only a few years away, from and only another few years beyond, the time when they have 10,000. Any sensible forecast must assume that in 10 years time Soviet atomic weapons may be

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numbered in five figures. The Russians may not have as large a stockpile as soon—but it is also possible that they may have it sooner.

There is much debate in the United States currently as to what number of atomic bombs delivered on the target is sufficient to wreck a large modern industrial society beyond the hope of recovery. In such discussions much depends on the meaning which is attached to the concept of "wrecking" a society. A society may still have great military strength, for example, at a time when it is already dead for most other purposes. Some students say that for the United States a few hundred bombs on target would be enough; others think that by careful planning and preparation our society could survive up to 2500. In the case of this letter estimate, the term "survival" must have a rather specialized meaning; 2500 atomic bombs of modern Soviet design would have a total force equal to about 100 million tons of high explosive, or 400 times the total load dropped on Germany by allied bombers in World War II. There is also much argument about the number of attacking aircraft which could get through to put these bombs on the target, and it is widely believed that on this point we can greatly increase our capability. But only the most optimistic hope to push the rate of successful delivery as low as 30%.

The meaning of these figures is plain. Even a com-

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Combination of our most optimistic assessments leads to the conclusion that the Soviet Union will be able to destroy our economy beyond the hope of recovery when she has 10,000 atomic bombs, while she might well have this ability when she has as few as 600. The lower figure might be reached, and the upper is not out of reach within the next decade. In twenty years time, if the arms race continues, the destructive capacity of such as to make the USSR can be at a level which makes all efforts at defense seem absurd.

When any great power has achieved a five figure stockpile of atomic weapons, it will probably have placed itself in such a position that its basic destructive capacity cannot be destroyed by any single surprise attack by any enemy. The mechanics of a mass surprise assault are singularly complex, and large stockpiles can be widely dispersed--more so as smaller aircraft become capable of delivering atomic bombs. If the atomic arms race continues, therefore, we shall have within a relatively few years a situation in which the two great powers will both have a clear-cut capacity to destroy the other, while each will be unable to exert that capacity except at the gravest risk of being destroyed in turn. Were it not for the fact that it is so near and so plainly important, the topic of the probable behavior of men and nations in such a situation might well be left alone on the ground that it defies an answer.

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Whatever else may be said of it, it is plainly unprecedented.

The power which will exist is not the power to win an ordinary military victory. It is rather the power to end a civilization and a very large number of the people in it.

Some students, emphasizing the sobering effect of the recognition of each other's capacities, believe that a period when bombs are numbered in tons of thousands on each side may be one of relative security. No one, they claim, will commit suicide for fear of death, and the reality of danger will

serve to prevent the leaders on both sides ^{from} throwing the switch. Others take the opposite view, holding that a world so dangerous will not be very calm, and suggesting that it is always possible for someone high in authority to make the mistake of thinking that if he is sufficiently bold and clever, he can in fact win a one way victory. Certainly there is precedence for this sort of thinking. Those who hold this latter sort of view point out further that in this case the deterrent fears will have to be effective every time; one failure will be enough.

Between these two contrasting views it is not easy to choose with certainty; it is doubtful if anyone can really be sure which is correct, since the assessment is necessarily conjectural. Yet this very uncertainty may be important. It may be that when they have plenty of bombs these two great

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powers will not destroy each other, but it is also conceivable that they will. ~~Perhaps~~ A world in which these great dangers are surrounded by these uncertainties is one which American policy should aim to prevent. Yet unless in some fashion there is achieved a limitation of the atomic arms race, this kind of world inevitably lies ahead.

One method of limiting the atomic arms race, of course, is to eliminate one of the parties engaged in the race. ^{Terrible} Fertile as this suggestion may be, and fraught as it almost surely is with consequences well beyond those implied in the initial decision, it cannot be dispensed as irrelevant. At the very least, it should be observed that as the time approaches when the Soviet Union will have a generally recognized capacity to destroy the society of the United States, the thought that action should be taken before it is too late will occur with a wholly new order of force and urgency in many important parts of this country. Given the ignorance which exists even at the very highest levels as to the reality of the Soviet atomic efforts, these thoughts may or may not occur at a time when they are accurately connected to the objective realities of the arms race, but this fact does not reduce their possible significance. The potential import of thoughts of this

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character is one illustration among many of the way in which the rapidity and power of expanding production of atomic weapons may have political effects so great that it becomes impossible to suppose that the arms race is merely a thermometer of the temperature of international tension, conflict.

Section III. The Character of American Policy Toward the Production and Use of Atomic Weapons.

In the decade since it embarked upon its first efforts to produce an atomic weapon, the United States Government has faced a series of decisions as to the way in which it would deal with the military uses of atomic energy. The cumulative effects of these decisions has been to create a situation in which it is increasingly possible that there may be an unlimited use of weapons of almost unlimited destructive power. in-on

The first great decision, of course, was the decision to try to develop a weapon. Taken in war time, and in the shadow of the possibility that the Nazis might be well ahead in their development of such weapons, this decision seems beyond criticism, yet it is clear in retrospect that this-to-the-one-point-at-which-contrary-decision-might-have-delayed-for-a-very-long-time-the-painful-attention-in-which Yet from this decision there came atomic weapons. Having developed something which looked as if it would be successfully have military value,

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^{Was} The United States is faced with the question whether it should use its new weapon. In the history of humanity, such decisions fall into two parts; the first question is whether you will use the weapon at all, and the second, historically decisions of this character with regard to military weapons fall into ^{classes} three parts. First, it is possible to decide that you will not use the weapon in any circumstances; such decisions are relatively rare. Second, it is possible to decide that you will use the weapon only if the enemy uses this weapon or something similar against you first; this kind of decision has been relatively frequent in recent generations, in connection with weapons which for one reason or another were considered to be inhuman. Finally, it is possible to decide simply that the weapon is useful in the service of victory, and should therefore be used; on balance this is the usual decision which is made with regard to new weapons. In the case of the atomic bomb, the American decision was the third. Taking the position that the fundamental wickedness is war and not weapons, the American government determined in 1945 that it would use atomic weapons to complete its victory over Japan and it has been a constant part of American policy since that time that in the event of an act of aggression toward the American government, it would feel free to use atomic weapons.

The third element in the American position on atomic

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weapons has been the determination of the United States to retain in its own hands the authority to determine whether, where, and how it proposed to use its atomic bomb. Although it is probable that there would not be any use of atomic weapons by the United States until some consideration had been given to the feelings of other nations, there is no formal provision for any such consideration, and still less is there any recognition by the United States that other powers may night usefully be included in deliberations on such a problem. In one sense, of course, this retention of unilateral authority is merely a continuation of the traditional independence and sovereignty of the United States government, a characteristic which is shared by many governments. But in another sense the atomic bomb is a special case. Both in Korea and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the military effort of the United States is now geared in with that of other nations and is operated under the authority of agencies that include among their active members many other countries. Especially in the case of the defense of Europe, there is no doubt that the considerations which govern allied decisions are not simply those of any one nation but those which are worked out together in the councils of a great coalition. The one military element of the defense of Europe for which this is in no sense true is the atomic bomb. All decisions

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With regard to the use of ~~these~~ weapon are decisions to be made by Americans only, acting under the orders of their own government without the participation, or perhaps even the knowledge of their colleagues and allies in other the uniforms of other nations. Since 1945 the United States has embarked on a policy of international collective security, both through the United Nations and through regional alliances. Yet in spite of this policy, quite extraordinary efforts have been made to retain as a uniquely American responsibility and power the whole question of the use of atomic weapons.

A fourth American decision, reached only gradually, and at least partly in response to Russian development, has been the decision to press toward the production of as large a stockpile as is ~~reasonably~~ ^{practicable} possible, as rapidly as possible. First it was supposed that a few atomic weapons would be decisive in any future war, and that any large stockpile would be unnecessary. But the more the problem has been considered, however, the more it has been felt that there is no limit to the number of bombs which would be desirable. Production is now being expanded to the point at which in a relatively few years the United States will be producing several thousand bombs a year, and the responsible organs of the government, both in Congress and in the Executive Branch, are increasingly committed to an energetic belief that the larger each addition to the

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American stockpile represents a most valuable addition to American strength for peace. In these circumstances, it is almost inconceivable that there should be any early mode action of present efforts to make as many bombs as possible as quickly as possible.

Fifth, having developed atomic weapons, having asserted its freedom to use them, having maintained its right to decide unilaterally when where and how it will use them, and having produced as many as it thinks it may reasonably need, the United States is in fact planning to use atomic bombs in the event of war, and this plan is in no way dependent upon any prior use of such weapons by any possible enemy. The two major hypothetical contests for which plans now exist are an inter-continental war with the Soviet Union, and a war for the defense of Western Europe; at present, both these contests may be expected to occur together, if they occur at all. In both contests, it is planned that atomic weapons will be used. Indeed, such is the present position of American weapons and military capabilities that it is extremely-hard exceedingly difficult to conceive of any contest conflict involving a direct contest with the Soviet Union in which atomic weapons would not be used.

Finally, the United States is currently committed to a concept of warfare in which it would react to any major

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hostile attack by an immediate and overpowering retaliation, in which it would be the objective of the American strategic air command to drop as many atomic bombs as quickly as possible on the strategic targets within the homeland of the enemy country. Under current strategic planning, once the switch is thrown, the American strategic air command will automatically carry out its basic plans for the destruction of the war making power of the Soviet Union. Practical considerations have led to the conclusion that if such an attack is to have its best chance of effectiveness, it must be conducted with great rapidity, and with a maximum concentration of forces. In such planning, moreover, there can be no abatement of the attack for political or other considerations, and there can hardly be time to pause for the selection of targets on other than a strictly military basis.

Any selection
This, then, is the pattern of the development of American policy toward atomic weapons in the last decade. From the initial decision to develop such a weapon the United States has proceeded, step by step, to a position in which the government appears determined that the first great military action by the United States government, in the event of war with the Soviet Union, will be a most massive atomic assault designed to end the Soviet will to resist, carrying with it, no matter what may be intended, many millions of casualties.

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and conceivably the destruction of Russian society as it now exists. This operation would be ordered by the United States government, acting alone, and it has a clear first claim upon the supplies which are so rapidly increasing in the American atomic stockpile.

Two additional characteristics of present American policy increase the significance of the current commitment to immediate and massive retaliatory action. First is the fact that in spite of the very considerable effort of rearmament which has been undertaken, this massive attack upon the industries and the population of the Soviet Union remains the major offensive capacity of the United States. This is not simply one way of dealing with the Soviet Union in the event of war; it is the only way now seriously considered as a pathway to victory or even to an acceptable end of hostilities. Secondly this intensive preoccupation with the development of a massive capacity for atomic attack is not matched, to put it mildly, by any corresponding concern for the defense of the country in case of a similar attack on the part of the Soviet Union. Indeed both the country and the responsible military authorities appear to be persuaded that the important characteristic of the atomic bomb is that it can be used against the Soviet Union; a quite astonishingly low level of attention has been given to the equally important fact that atomic bombs can be used

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by the Soviet Union against the United States.

In sum, then, the atomic policy of the United States is developing along the following lines: the first reliance of the nation both to prevent war by deterring the Soviet Union, and to win a war if it comes, is atomic capacity for massive atomic attack on the Soviet Union; the United States does not have any other major capacity; the United States is not matching its offensive atomic capabilities by any corresponding energetic efforts to provide for its own defense against atomic weapons. This strategic situation is a result of a series of decisions taken in recent years, and of the set of attitudes deeply ingrained in American military men, and finally, of a deep-seated unwillingness on the part of the American people to face the fact that the atomic bomb works both ways. At present, the decisions which have led to this situation are so deeply imbedded in the Government, and in the consciousness of responsible officers, that they are not even open to question. Yet it takes no very vivid imagination to see ^{that} as the Russians, in turn, develop their own stock of atomic weapons, ~~that~~ the United States will be forced to face the unpleasant fact that it can use its atomic weapons only at the gravest possible danger of ^{the} incurring _{the} destruction of American society. The sharp ^{the} significance of this developing danger is perhaps partly obscured

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by the fact that the military concept of both "defense" is not the same as that which is held by the ordinary citizen. For military men, the problem of defense is the problem of defending those parts of the society which are immediately relevant to its war-making power. In particular, in current American strategic thinking, the first priority of defense is that of defending the strategic air command. Military authorities are not eager to assume the responsibility for the general defense of population, habitations, and the other non-military phenomena of American life. This is emphatically not because of inhumanity, but because of the ~~present~~ and traditionally proper military definition of the objective of a military defense. What is new about the current situation is, however, that it is now possible to destroy a society without destroying its military power. When this becomes possible, the members of that society are likely not to suppose that it is terribly important if they maintain a military capacity after all that they care about has been destroyed. Thus the time may come when the American people, slowly becoming aware of the degree to which they themselves are now increasingly in the front line of defense in any atomic war, may conclude, at one time or another, either that it is essential to unleash the strategic air command at once, or that it is imperative that this command

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never start an atomic war, since it could not end it. Either of these conclusions would be, in very large part, the result of the special character of present American policy in the atomic arms race. And even if neither of them came to pass, the dangers of the present position would persist. That danger, bluntly stated, is that there is built into the policy of the United States a decision to react on an inflexibly catastrophic scale to ~~specifically~~ any open Soviet military challenge.

There are many causes for the fact that American atomic policy has developed as it has, and no one need suppose that there has been at any stage of its development any easy alternative course ^{to which} that has actually been followed. Most certainly it is not the object of the present analysis to demonstrate that what has been done is wrong. The conclusion which is asserted from this analysis is once more limited and perhaps more important. It is simply that the fact that American policy has developed as it has is a fact which makes it difficult to accept the contention that the notion of limitation of armaments should be discarded as irrelevant to our contemporary scene. While it must obviously be granted that this notion has not figured largely in current policy toward the atomic bomb, it also seems plain that the arms race in which this policy has so large a role is not one which can be dis-

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arded as unimportant for international politics; at the very least it is something more than a thermometer showing high temperatures which come from other sources.

Section IV. The Military Reach Exceeds the Political Grasp.

The race in atomic weapons has the characteristic that the two great powers are both rapidly developing a capacity to do each other military damage in a manner and to a degree which very far exceed anything which they can do to each other or any connection which they may have with each other in any other way. It is true, as already noted, that the political and economic interests of the United States and the USSR are in conflict with one another at many points throughout the world; the normal characteristic of these conflicts, however, is that the nearer you come to the boundary line, the more nearly marginal they become. Even in Germany, where the stakes are greatest, and the lines most sharply drawn, what is at stake is something much less than the survival of the two societies. Without the atomic bomb the pattern of contest between the United States and the Soviet Union would be one in which we might expect a seesaw one power or the other might be expected to make limited gains, up to the point at which a combination of distance and energetic interest reversed the balance of effort. Neither side would have the capacity to destroy the other, and sooner or later it might

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be expected that the lines of division would stabilize, and the two powers begin to learn the arts of coexistence. The capacity to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction on a massive scale radically alters the picture. This simple fact gives to the atomic bomb a political significance all its own; and since the production of atomic weapons has this direct and active political meaning, a direct and active political meaning must be attached to any proposal for the limitation of such weapons.

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Section V. The Persistent Persistence of the Limitation
or Moderation of the Arms Race.

In combination, the special characteristics of the current arms race which have just been considered force the conclusion that there is both reality and urgency in the political objective of ^{the} limiting or moderating present contest in the production of weapons of mass destruction. Both the times scale and the magnitude of the expanding production of the atomic weapons are such as to make the growing atomic stock piles in themselves a quite sufficient cause for refusing to accept as the last word that skepticism about the notion of disarmament which is the natural product of the history of the 1920's and 1930's. When, in addition, full weight is given to the extraordinary posture into which a heavy dependence upon atomic weapons is forcing the United States, and to the fact that atomic weapons bring the United States and the U.S.S.R. within military range of each other in a fashion which would otherwise be quite beyond the power of either,

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It must be recognized that weapons of mass destruction are having political effects of such magnitude that they have become in themselves political facts of the first order. It follows that there is political meaning to the notion of limiting, controlling, or redirecting policy with regard to these weapons.

What does not follow, however, is that disarmament or even some modification of the arms race is necessarily or self-evidently in the American interest. The fact that the arms race carries its dangers does not mean that there is some other less dangerous course. Nothing in what has been discussed makes the power and hostility of the Soviet Union less important; nor does the magnitude of the problem of weapons of mass destruction necessarily mean that this problem can be separated from other great political questions which have arisen in the contest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. If, on balance, considerations which have been examined so far permit the assumption that questions of the limitations of armaments are of sufficient importance to deserve the most careful consideration, they do not allow any

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conclusion that such limitation is absolutely
desirable, or even possible.

One less sweeping conclusion, however, does perhaps emerge. If it be true that questions of the limitation of armaments can have little meaning unless they are closely connected with the reality of international politics, and if also it be true that there is a present urgency and importance in trying to find ways of moderating the present arms race, then perhaps no action should be taken which gives the impression that the limitation of armaments is not relevant to the present problem of relations with the Soviet Union. If this conclusion be valid, it casts considerable doubt upon the desirability of pressing forward with the current work of the Disarmament Commission in the United Nations. That work turns upon the preparation of detailed schemes for the balanced reduction of armament in which full provision is made for extensive disclosure and verification, for control by international authority, ^{and} in general for a level of openness and security such that if it could ever be reached, could fairly be said that the ~~present~~ present problem of the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. These paper plans are the

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result, it is true, of a well considered and wholly honest effort to make it plain that the United States and her allies would genuinely prefer the world they represent to that in which they now find themselves. To the degree that those who hear about these plans share these preferences, these proposals may have a useful effect upon public opinion. But this effect is counterbalanced, indeed overbalanced, by the fact that by their very insistence upon these proposals, the western powers appear to argue that the limitation of armaments is relevant only when it is embodied in plans of such complexity and that to anyone concerned with the pressing international issues of 1952 they cannot but seem quite unreal. It is no service to the cause of moderation of the arms race to allow the conclusion that any effort to limit it is somehow unreal.

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Part TwoToward a Moderation of the Arms Race

As it considers the possibilities of moderating the present contest in armaments, the United States Government has available two kinds of action -- that kind which involves an agreement negotiated with other powers, and that kind which is available as a unilateral action of the United States. It is plain that these two types of action are not wholly separable; the unilateral actions of any state affect its international position, and of course any agreed international understanding will affect its individual position. Nevertheless, the two kinds of behavior have distinct differences; the simplest and most obvious is that while it may never be possible to get any international agreement, it is always within the power of any sovereign government to take unilaterally decisions which it considers wise. This basic distinction seems enough in itself to suggest that it is appropriate to consider the two kinds of actions separately. This is what is attempted in the following sections.

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As a preface to this analysis, it is
that
appropriate to re-emphasize this entire inquiry
takes its meaning from a sense of the dangers
which beset the United States in the modern world.
The two greatest of these dangers are the persis-
tent and deeply rooted hostility of the Soviet
Power, on the one hand, and the rapidly increasing
destructive power of atomic weapons on the other.
Each of these dangers is sufficient in itself to
provide a searching test of the skill and energy of
American policy; ^{the} magnitude of our present peril
derives from the fact that the two dangers must
inevitably be considered together. It will not be
surprising if no simple formula for salvation will
emerge from the discussion that follows.

Section VI. Problems of Negotiation

A. Its Difficulty and Urgency

No one who has observed the international
scene in recent years will be surprised by the
assertion that it is not easy to negotiate with the
rulers of the Soviet Union. Over and over again it

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has been demonstrated that the Soviet concept of
negotiation in good faith is entirely different
from that which is followed, or at least honored,
in the West. The meaning of words has been dis-
torted, the privacy of discussion has been violated,
the most elementary standards of international good
manners have been flagrantly violated. So painful
were these experiences, and so little did the actions
of the Soviet Union jibe with its professions ^{of} peace,
that the United States Government gradually reached
the conclusion that it would be possible to negotiate
usefully with the Russians only when there had been
established "situations of strength" in the position
of the non-Soviet world. Then and only then might it
be possible to reach agreements based on a recognition
by the Soviet Union of the facts of life.

When attention is narrowed to the question of negotiation with regard to armaments, the difficulties appear to increase. If situations of strength are the only things which the Soviet Union can understand, it clearly becomes dangerous to consider the abandonment of any such situation. It is not wicked or unnatural that those who bear the responsibility for the military

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posture of the West should be reluctant to take chances in any bargain on the limitation of arms.

In the early years after the war, the pattern of settlement at which western statesmen were aiming was a pattern of relatively cordial and cooperative co-existence; in working for such a world, it was appropriate to discount dangers which no responsible

For today, the pattern of political settlement cannot be left to take care of itself. Any agreement to moderate armaments must be judged in the light of its effect upon the balance of power all over the world.

A still further difficulty in negotiation arises from the fact that the United States and her allies have exceedingly little trustworthy information as to the real military power of the Soviet Union.

International negotiations ordinarily rest upon the ability of both sides to form some reasonable assessment of ~~negotiating~~ ^{evaluating} their respective bargaining positions. Any nation negotiating with the Soviet Union must experience very great difficulty in reaching

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any such assessment. How can you conduct any mutual negotiations with a large black box? It is only natural that responsible officials who make their military plans preparations in terms of the possibility that what is inside the black box may be very large and powerful indeed should take a different view they are asked to consider how much they would be willing to give up in negotiations looking toward the limitation of armaments. Then the pressing danger will naturally seemed to be that one may concede too much; the enemy inside the box, ~~unreliability~~ one may begin to think, is perhaps weaker than he seemed, and he should not be allowed to win at the council ~~with~~ table what he could not exert by force. The military leaders of the Western powers are responsible for the safety of their respective nations; they have firmly in mind the great and evident fact that the Soviet Power is hostile; as they exercise their professional responsibility to advise on the conduct of negotiations for the limitation of armaments, their first concern will almost surely be for the

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establishment of iron-clad safe guards against the possibility that the negotiations might in some way turn to the advantage of the enemy. And since they are so largely ignorant of the character of the enemy, the number of safe guards must inevitably multiply.

Although in some respects the deep concern of military advisers may be one-sided or ~~exaggerated~~ exaggerated, it is no part of this argument to suggest that the considerations which govern this kind of military counsel are trivial. On the contrary, they appear to be soundly based upon a realistic assessment of the power and ~~means~~ of the Soviet Union under its present leadership. Nevertheless, if these considerations should lead to the conclusion that ~~negotiations with the Soviet Union~~ it is impossible to negotiate with the Soviet Union about the moderation of the arms race, ^{an} error would be committed at least equal to that of supposing that there is no danger ^{for} in the Soviet power. But there is a second danger, the danger which inheres in the arms race itself. If

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this second danger is given its full weight, and if the pressing relevance of the problem of the control of armaments is recognized, the difficulties which compound the problem of negotiations take on a quite different color.

First, ~~inherently~~ ^{if it} it could be recognized that the arms race carries its own grave dangers, it no longer seems wholly certain that it is wise to wait for the establishment of situations of strength ~~xxx~~ before attempting to negotiate.

Moreover, the danger which lies in the arms race is a danger to both of the great powers, it becomes at least conceivable that this common danger might become, for the Soviet Union, an incentive to genuine negotiation. The theory of negotiation from situations of strength rests on some measure upon these two propositions: first, that the United States can afford to wait until, with its allies, it has established such situations; and second, that only such situations could ~~incentives~~ induce the Soviet Union to enter any genuine negotiation. Because of its peculiar speed and power, the atomic arms race may invalidate both of these propositions.

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For the United States it may very soon be desirable to accept agreements involving a level of safety very much lower than that which we have seemed desirable in recent years, and the same thing ~~and~~ ^{and} a change could quite possibly occur in the attitude of the U.S.S.R.

Second, as stockpiles of atomic bombs increase in both countries, there are dangers which might overshadow those which may be involved in any limitation of armaments.

Nothing can change the fact that if you undertake negotiations in good faith and the expectation of bargaining, you cannot be sure where you will emerge. But, if you come to be sufficiently displeased with the situation in which you find yourself, you may well ~~minimum~~ conclude that on balance you can afford to take chances which you would not take if you were happy ~~minimum~~ with the existing situation.

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Finally, when it is placed under the
strong light of the atomic arms race, black
box of Soviet power shows itself not to be
simply an obstacle to understanding, but a
very great evil in itself. For it then appears
that it is not so much the power of the Soviet
Union as what we do not know about that power
that drives us forward in our own headlong half
of the arms race. The United States does not
know what the U.S.S.R. is doing, and so its own
military planning becomes the envelope of all
its fears. Yet this military planning contains
terrible dangers, and not simply to the Russians.
It thus becomes a matter of high urgency to seek
by all possible means ~~xxxxxxxx~~ to find ways in
which in some small measure western ignorance of
Russian power may be lessened. While
conventional analysis, it might be supposed that the
danger of Soviet secrecy was in what it concealed,
analysis in the light of the atomic arms race
suggests that its greater danger comes simply in
the fact that it exists.

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Thus, where an analysis in terms of the Soviet danger only would suggest that negotiations must be enormously difficult, an analysis based on the assessment of both the Russian atomic production and atomic danger forces the conclusion that negotiations ~~cannot be conducted~~ may be at once difficult and urgent in very high measure. Nothing in this analysis demonstrates that a successful negotiation is possible. Nothing suggests that it can be conducted without risk. But evidently the fact that something may not work is no excuse for failure to try, and it is not beyond the capacity of American diplomacy to limit the risks which are involved. No unacceptable agreement need be accepted, and skillful diplomacy can mitigate the losses which might come from any characteristic ^{of the} Soviet breach of ~~confidence~~ privacy of the negotiations.

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B. The Nature of Useful Negotiation

If it is intended to use the process of negotiation as one possible means of meeting the twin dangers of the Soviet Union and the atomic arms race, then it is important that such negotiations be undertaken with a recognition of their necessary character. In particular, they would have to be private, prolonged, and real. Privacy does not mean secrecy. It cannot be supposed that the United States government would be able to conduct large-scale negotiations with anyone and prevent the fact that such negotiations were in progress from becoming generally known. What could be protected is the content and course of the negotiations, and this protection would be important. Another form of privacy would also be so highly desirable as to be very nearly essential, and that is that the negotiation should take place between the United States and the USSR, without participation by even the major allies of the two great powers.

Negotiations limited to the two great powers would involve, for the United States, the assumption of a role amounting to that of the United States of a high degree of responsibility for fair consideration of the interests of her allies. It would also require on the part of these allies a certain willingness to recognize the primary responsibility which inevitably rests upon the United States. The difficulties

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which would attend this sort of "delegated diplomacy" should not be minimized, but neither should they be exaggerated.

It is most unlikely that useful negotiations with the USSR can be conducted in any short space of time. Any real agreement would require a long period of discussion and deliberation on both sides. It is also highly possible that early attempts might fail, and that an acceptable agreement might not result until after many abortive efforts had been made. So long as the United States and the USSR remain committed to the views which they now hold, it seems probable that the knot of their differences will resist efforts to cut it by a single stroke.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, there is no profit in negotiations which aim merely at "making a record." Efforts of this character are always perilously close to hypocrisy, and in any case no one-sided record of good intentions has any relevance to the dangers which make negotiation urgent.

C. The Field of Negotiation

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6. The Field of Negotiations

Diplomats who are assigned to undertake negotiations generally wish to know the range of subjects within which it is proposed to seek some form of agreement. Unfortunately, the problem of the limitation of armaments is such that it seems impossible to give any clear answer to this question in advance of the undertaking of actual negotiations. On the other hand there is something quite unmanageable about undertaking negotiations which have no limit restriction whatever. Perhaps the best that can be done is to define an appropriate area for initial discussions.

Whatever may be the specific and peculiar danger of the atomic arms race, it remains clear that the problem of armaments cannot be arbitrarily separated from other problems of international politics. Mr. Churchill may not be entirely correct in his often repeated assertion that it is the atomic bomb which has defended Europe since 1945, but a much more limited assumption would be sufficient to make it plain that atomic weapons have had and currently still have a significance bearing upon the international political situation. For the United States, quite plainly, any international agreement which restricted its freedom to use the atomic weapon would be an international agreement having heavy political implication. And although the problem of the atomic stockpile might not be so

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immediately urgent for the USSR, there are other aspects to the limitation of armaments which would have heavy political implications for the future of the Soviet Union. If it be true, as seems likely, that one indispensable element in any such agreement from the American point of view would be some modification in the secrecy which presently surrounds the USSR, then any successful agreement would imply some modification of the policy of the iron curtain. Let that policy, in the view of most students of the Soviet Union, is most intimately related to the nature of the Soviet regime. To these examples many others could be added. It seems entirely clear that there is no prospect of an agreement to limit arms which does not have political meaning. It follows that the political implications must be balanced in the same fashion as those which relate to armaments. This part of the lesson of the period before the Second World War is not invalidated by the special danger of the atomic arms race.

Yet it would be unwise to be dogmatic about the degree to which an agreement to moderate the contest in atomic arms must inevitably involve political repercussions. For example, the time might come in a relatively few years when atomic weapons would cease to have the protective effect which has existed for Western Europe in recent years. When it becomes possible for the Soviet Union, without fear of prevention,

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to carry out a devastating atomic attack on the cities of Western Europe, it may be that the overall situation in that part of the world would be improved, from the point of view of the West, if all atomic weapons could be swept from the domain of international politics. It may also appear, that as time goes on, that there is possible a certain measure of arms limitation under agreements which would not fully ~~annihilate~~ the political effect of the policy of the iron curtain; it may be possible to arrange the methods of disclosure and inspection which are relatively acceptable from this point of view. Changes of this character cannot be fully predicted; both time and the course of any negotiations which should be undertaken may be expected to modify the pattern of politics within which an agreement on the limitation of armaments might have value. The best that can be said here is that ~~while-the-boundary-of-the-field-of-negotiation-cannot-be-ignored-with-certainly-exceed~~ that of

the eventual field of negotiation will certainly be somewhat wider than the single subject of armament. How much wider it may be, it is impossible to foretell, and for this reason it seems best to limit the present analysis to problems which arise directly from consideration of the content in armaments itself.

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IV. The Limitation of Arms

It seems a safe presumption that any agreement to moderate the arms race which may in fact be negotiated between the United States and the USSR will fall very far short of any of the plans which have been supported by the United States government since the end of World War II, in the level of security which they provide. The plan for the control of atomic energy originally foreshadowed in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, and now supported by a heavy majority in the United Nations, aimed at the establishment of a system in which it would be impossible for any nation to secrete the material for even one atomic bomb. This plan also envisaged a level of inspection and control which now seems clearly incompatible with the maintenance of the Soviet political system, or at least what Soviet rulers suppose to be necessary for that system. In the years just after 1945 a very high value was placed upon the military significance of very small numbers of atomic weapons; it was not uncommon to find serious students who supposed that five or ten bombs in the right place might be enough. In more recent years this kind of thinking has been radically modified. Military planners now find it difficult to make effective preparations for the use of atomic weapons unless they are allowed to think in terms of hundreds or even thousands. At the same time

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the West has learned to understand that the pattern of secret power does not permit the kind of international cooperation which was envisaged in the Acheson-Lilienthal report and in the plans which grew out of it.

Taken together, these two changes suggest that in the field of atomic weapons, the real objectives of the United States might be very different from those which are embodied in the United Nations plan. Since the Soviet Union has been producing fissionable material for three years, it is no longer possible to establish any system of control that would prevent the Russians from successfully hiding a few atomic bombs, but on the other hand, no such protection is now essential. The basic present requirement of any control plan is rather that it should make it impossible for either great power to destroy the war-making capacity of the other by a surprise blow. For the case of the United States and the USSR, this requirement means simply that it must be impossible for any power to secretly build and equip a striking force armed with weapons of mass destruction. This task is quite evidently very different from that of preventing the production of a single secret atomic weapon.

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Another important difference between the present situation and that which was envisaged in 1946 is that there is no immediate urgency, and no very high value, in the so-called peacetime uses of atomic power. At least by comparison with the dangers which are presented by the continuous production of fissionable material, these peacetime uses, for the next generation, seem likely to have a value so moderate that it would be reasonable to accept arrangements which made all atomic power inaccessible.

J Taken together, these considerations suggest that it may be possible to achieve an acceptable level of safety in the field of atomic weapons by means of an agreement much less detailed and far-reaching than that envisaged in the United Nations Plan. A simple agreement to destroy existing stock-piles and discontinue the production of fissionable material could probably be monitored to an acceptable level of safety by an inspection limited to the actual process of destruction of the fissionable material and the examination of major atomic installations. If it could be reached in the next few years, while the Russian stockpile is still of a closely measurable size, an agreement of this sort might well provide a genuine guarantee against the danger of a surprise atomic attack of major size.

A somewhat more difficult problem is posed, however, by such other weapons of mass destruction as those employed in biological or chemical warfare. Installations which produce

flammable material are large, and the level of inspection which would be needed to make sure that no such plants had been hidden is not high. In the case of weapons of biological and chemical warfare, however, this is no longer true. In order to provide reasonable safeguards against these weapons, it becomes necessary to widen the area of agreement beyond the weapons to the instruments of delivery. It seems likely that any agreement which was to give real protection against the danger of a ~~surprise~~ major surprise attack would have to include a reduction of bomber fleets to levels much more modest than those which are now in prospect.

It has already been suggested that the time may come when a simple limitation of the atomic arms race may become desirable for all concerned as a result of the extraordinary ominous dangers which the growing atomic stockpiles present; these dangers may turn the attention of statesmen to considerations of the lesser evil, and may persuade them to abandon the dangerous pursuit of goals which are likely to lead to general war. And just as the character of an acceptable agreement on atomic weapons is much modified when it is recognized that not absolute but relative security is the goal, so in the field of conventional weapons an approach of modest character may permit surprising results. For example, if an agreement could be reached which reduced the level of conventional armaments throughout the world to such a point that no major Power had more than one-third or one-half as much strength as it would need to conduct a successful war of aggression against other major Powers, it would become possible to accept a kind

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of inspection and control much less onerous than anything currently proposed. Large efforts in the field of conventional armaments cannot be fully concealed by any iron curtain, and it seems likely that a few hundred inspectors, armed with relatively modest rights of visitation and inquiry, could provide wholly satisfactory assurance against the danger that the Soviet Union or any other Power might successfully double its military strength in secret. Initial disclosure there would have to be, and this initial disclosure would have to be verified with some care. But once there is reasonable confidence as to the existing levels of armament among the great Powers, there is no reason why the burden of inspection should not be moderate.

These considerations permit the conclusion that a feasible and useful pattern of disarmament may be far less complex and demanding than current proposals suggest. It does not follow, however, that even what is here suggested put forward would be easy to achieve. Both for the United States and for the Soviet Union the adjustments involved would still be very considerable. The problem of the United States may perhaps be left to later consideration; the Soviet problem seems likely to center around the fact that no arms limitation of any sort seems feasible without a certain minimum amount of disclosure and verification. The modification of its intensive pattern of secrecy is a large step for the U.S.S.R. It seems quite clear that Russian secrecy has an importance, both for the Soviet Union and for the United States, very much greater than anything we may think that we ourselves ^{may} have to

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concessions. So great is the difference now that the United States would gain greatly if it could negotiate an agreement under which both sides would tell all. Unfortunately it seems clear that no such agreement is now possible, for the very reasons which would make it so one-sided.

It seems probable, therefore, that before the United States can secure Soviet agreement to any useful level~~ing~~ of disclosure it will have to make concessions in some area of special Soviet interest. One possible bargain might be for the United States to offer to accept a prohibition of the use of the atomic bomb in return for a real and considerable measure of disclosure and verification. Probably no such offer is now possible, but the advantage of freedom to use the bomb may be expected to decline, for reasons already stated; and it should be noted that like all genuine negotiations, an attempt to limit the arms contest will require genuine concessions on both sides. In any event, this is the kind of bargain that might have some reciprocity. This much seems clear: if the two Powers could reach such an agreement, the world might well be relieved of some of the dangers which now lurk in the headlong accumulation of weapons intended to ward off some nameless and unknown peril. Not the thermometer only, but the temperature itself might be lowered.

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Quite obviously, much detailed work and earnest consideration would be necessary before it would be possible for the United States to give final formulation to any set of proposals which an American negotiator might be empowered to bring forward in the course of real negotiations. The negotiations which have been presented here are intended simply to indicate the character of the problems which arise when the question of arms limitation is in fact considered as a real question. If none of them is wholly satisfactory, that is not entirely because of the inadequacy of the study that they have received. It is perhaps also, at least in part, an indication of the degree to which any plan for disarmament which is to have reality will also be imperfect. It can never be easy to combine a recognition of the Soviet peril with a full recognition of the peril of the arms race. It will never be easy to find a good place to start. * The fact remains that the way to begin negotiations is to begin them, and that real negotiations necessarily have the characteristic that the final result cannot be foreseen from the beginning.

*This consideration is in large measure responsible for the recommendation of the Panel of Consultants with respect to the test of a thermonuclear weapon.

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7 and perhaps the final importance of a real effort at negotiation in the field of armaments is that such an effort could not but have its educational effect. If it were a real effort, proceeding from an awareness of the dangers to which the human race is leading, it would give a real opportunity to spread understanding of the dangers both abroad and at home, both in the Soviet Union and in the West. It is always possible that the Soviet Union may be impervious to such educational efforts, but if this be true, the future is in any case unlikely to suggest that no great wrongdoing here can come from trying. It may also be true, and after all, that the mind and temper of the American people has so far hardened as to make it impossible to conduct genuine negotiations for the United States government, on its side, to conduct genuine negotiations. It is certainly possible that the rulers of the Soviet Union may have reached this conclusion. Yet-to-state-such-propositions-to-be-reject-the-action-that-nothing. Yet the mere statement of such propositions is enough to lead on to the response that something must be done about it; only the most fatalistic of students can oppose the notion of negotiation simply on the ground that it is already too late. Certainly this much is clear--a permanent opposition to all negotiation will eventually make it, indeed, too late.

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Section VII. The Posture of the United States.

Whether or not effective negotiation is possible, the developing character of the arms race has certain implications for the United States which suggests that it may be desirable for the American Government to ^{make} ~~pick~~ certain adjustments, on its own; such adjustments may be divided into two categories--those which affect the organization of the government, administrative method by which the government reaches its decisions, and those which affect the attitude of mind with which it approaches its problems. The first problem is one of organization, and the second is one of style. Once again the two questions are inter-connected and overlapping.

A. Organization.

The present orientation of the American Government is in the direction of energetic action to meet the danger of Soviet aggression. In particular, in the field of weapons, the United States is poised to deliver a ~~massive~~ atomic attack whenever the signal is given. Such is the character of this posture that the day-to-day responsibility for planning and preparation is decentralized to levels of government far below that of the highest political authority. The problem of the military attack upon the Soviet Union has been in very large measure divorced from considerations of ^{policy} politics.

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If it be correct that the fundamental danger to the
peril is matched by the peril of the atomic arms race, it seems
plain that it is not correct bad policy to decentralize the
command and control of atomic weapons, and still less wise to
leave the problem of atomic planning in the hands of men
whose only consideration is what they can do to the USSR.
To permit this decentralization is to provide in quite un-
balanced fashion for one danger and to ignore the other com-
pletely. The perils that face American policy are complex
and interlocking. The organization which attempts to deal with
them must be correspondingly flexible. Moreover, it must
be integrated in such a way that basic responsibility and
authority are held together at the top. If this is not done,
those who are engaged in combatting the Soviet peril at one
point or another will almost inevitably become fixed in
partial viewpoints. In quite different ways, this danger
and the consequences of such fixity now appear in the plans
of the American strategic air command, and in the proposals
made by the United States in the United Nations. Another
example of the same kind of rigidity is the increasingly wide-
spread effort to separate military from political considera-
tions. In a crisis like the one in which the United States
finds itself, such separation, at the level of policy, becomes
both unnatural and dangerous. Policy cannot be made by waiting

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a statement of objectives objectives and passing all operational responsibility to one department or another. Policy is a sum of actions, and when the objects of policy are complex, the reins of control must be closely held. The responsible use of atomic weapons, like the responsible ^{Techniques} use of the weapons of negotiation, ^{impl} requires the continuous control and attention of the President of the United States and his most senior advisers.

B. Style.

Important as it is to recognize the need for negotiation, and great as the need may be for a closer organizational control of major decisions within the government, it may well be that the greatest single contribution which the United States can make to the cause of peace is a contribution in the intangible area of style and attitude. ~~is to sufficient to avoid the feeling that it~~

The first and most important component of such a new style would be an openly acknowledged, and indeed proclaimed awareness of the reality of the atomic peril. The ^{Government} Americans owe it to itself, and to its people, to demonstrate its understanding of the fact that atomic weapons are not simply a handy device for the elimination of those with whom the United States may find herself at war, but rather a great and rapidly growing threat to all civilized societies, and

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conspicuously that of the United States itself. A recognition of this great danger would involve many readjustments; it would involve an increase in our attention to the pressing problems of air defense, a recognition of the degree to which our own atomic weapons ^{are} in a sense a wasting asset, and an explicit acknowledgement of the reality of dangers which, as a people and as a nation government, we now tend to sweep under the rug. The awareness of danger within the government, and candor to the American people with regard to this danger, are the first and basic components of a policy of style. *

Next in order, perhaps, is the need for a full awareness of the position and purpose of those whom we hold as friends throughout the world. They too are required to face the twin perils of the Soviet threat and the atomic arms race, and unlike ourselves they do not have atomic stockpiles of their own. They nevertheless retain the highest degree of political importance, and American policy toward the twin dangers cannot but be weakened to the degree that it is separated from theirs. This implies that a yet balanced and flexible policy toward the use of atomic energy might well include as one of its components some recognition of an obligation to consult with friendly powers before resorting to any use of atomic energy. Those who are terrified by any such

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suggestions are perhaps already in the grip by the very
irrationalities which so gravely increase the peril of the
atomic contest. ~~We must~~

We must be aware of our dangers; we must be aware
of our friends; and thirdly, we must be alert to the character
of the enemy. The Soviet danger is real, but it is not un-
limited, or beyond analysis. Unless we are to take refuge
in the shallow hope that it may somehow disappear, it offers
the vicious persistent choice of co-existence or a third
World War. For those who wish to avoid the Third World War,
therefore, the acceptance of the danger of the Soviet
Union must be accompanied by a conscious limitation upon the
range of hostilities which is permissible. Unreasoning fear
and unlimited hatred are both unhelpful and unbecoming. The
cure for both is knowledge, and in return for knowledge much
may be offered. Finally, and in general conclusion to the
whole of this report, it may be suggested that American
policy in the 1950's must be governed by a persistent refusal
to be bound in any one rigid course. Where dangers are
varied, flexibility is vital. The pattern of policy, the
pattern of armaments, and the pattern of purpose may all
be expected to change with almost kaleidoscopic speed and variety
in the coming decade. Whatever may be the balanced awareness o

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of the American government and people, different times in this decade will produce different attitudes both here and abroad. Opportunities which ~~seem~~ unreal may suddenly become practicable; positions which now seem valid may become out of date. If the arms race is to be moderated, and if the Russian danger is to be met, if, in short, both freedom and peace are to be served, there will be need for action and watchful waiting, for firmness and for moderation, flexibility, for strength and moderation. Such are the dangers of our age that there can be no assurance of success even if all of these required qualities are conspicuously demonstrated. But it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that without them, the future is not bright.